

Overview of a PQC proposal: the Picnic signature scheme

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Outline

1. Introduction

2. Primitives and other ingredients

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The Picnic proposal

Highlights:

- ▶ A signature scheme (KeyGen, sign, verify)
- ▶ No number theoretic or structured hardness assumptions
- ▶ Security reduction to symmetric primitives (hash, block-cipher)
- ▶ Construction based on a ZKPoK
- ▶ Ingredients: Σ protocol, Fiat-Shamir and Unruh transforms, “MPC in the head”

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
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
- ▶ This seems to work: I'll set $c = \text{Hash}(g^k)$.
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This is a Schnorr signature (I think).

Picnic — illustration at high-level




is a one-way function

Picnic — illustration at high-level



- given U and Y , I claim I know X

Picnic — illustration at high-level




In Picnic :

■ is an encryption function called LOW MC


Y is the encryption of **U** under key **X**

Picnic — illustration at high-level



- public key pk is (U, Y)
- private key sk is X

Picnic — illustration at high-level



As in Schnorr's signature scheme, we will first need a ZK proof of knowledge of X.

A circuit-based S3PC setup

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ON A CIRCUIT FOR LOW MC

for each input wire: split its boolean value v into three random shares a_1, a_2, a_3 such that $v = a_1 + a_2 + a_3$

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
for each output wire: reveal the three shares

NEXT




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INITIAL INPUT SHARES AND RANDOM BITS



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
COMMUNICATE



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
OUTPUT SHARES

$$c_i = a_i b_i + a_i b_{i+1} + a_{i+1} b_i + k_i + k_{i+1}$$




A circuit-based S3PC setup

COMMIT



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
DECOMMIT TWO



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
VERIFY

$$c_2 = a_2 b_2 + a_2 b_0 + a_0 b_2 + k_2 + k_0$$



A circuit-based S3PC setup

VERIFY



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Primitives and other ingredients

- ▶ Commitment schemes
- ▶ Zero Knowledge Proofs of knowledge (ZKPoKs)
- ▶ Transformation for non-interactivity: Fiat-Shamir, Unruh
- ▶ Low-MC and SHA3
- ▶ MPC in the head
- ▶ PRNG using SHAKE

Parameters

Parameter Set	S	n	k	s	r	Hash/KDF	Digest length	T	Public key	Private key	Signature
picnic-L1-FS	128	128	128	10	20	SHAKE128	256	219	32	16	34000
picnic-L1-UR									32	16	53929
picnic-L3-FS	192	192	192	10	30	SHAKE256	384	329	48	24	76740
picnic-L3-UR									48	24	121813
picnic-L5-FS	256	256	256	10	38	SHAKE256	512	438	64	32	132824
picnic-L5-UR									64	32	209474